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In quantum mechanics, nonlocality (a violation of a Bell inequality) is intimately linked to com-
plementarity, by which we mean that consistently assigning values to different observables at the
same time is not possible. Nonlocality can only occur when some of the relevant observables do
not commute, and this noncommutativity makes the observables complementary. Beyond quantum
mechanics, the concept of complementarity can be formalized in several distinct ways. Here we
describe some of these possible formalizations and ask how they relate to nonlocality. We par-
tially answer this question by describing two toy theories which display nonlocality and obey the
no-signaling principle, although each of them does not display a certain kind of complementarity.
The first toy theory has the property that it maximally violates the CHSH inequality, although
the corresponding local observables are pairwise jointly measurable. The second toy theory also
maximally violates the CHSH inequality, although its state space is classical and all measurements
are mutually nondisturbing: if a measurement sequence contains some measurement twice with any
number of other measurements in between, then these two measurements give the same outcome
with certainty.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the groundbreaking work of Bell [3], it has been
recognized that quantum theory cannot be completed to
a theory with local hidden variables; this result is known
as Bell’s theorem, or almost synonymously as quantum
nonlocality. Bell’s theorem is usually proven by deriving
inequalities for the correlations between observables lo-
cated at spatially separated sites, which are satisfied for
any theory having local hidden variables, but violated
by many quantum-mechanical models. See [12] or [5] for
background on Bell’s theorem, including a clear overview
of properties of hidden variable theories and the precise
assumptions needed for the proof of Bell’s theorem.
The fact that Bell inequalities can be violated in many
quantum-mechanical models stems from the fact that,
due to non-commutativity, a simultaneous joint measure-
ment of these observables is not possible; quantum ob-
servables display complementarity. But what does this
mean, exactly? And what happens beyond quantum me-
chanics? From a theory-independent perspective, how do
nonlocality and complementarity relate? This is the kind
of question we are concerned with in this paper.
Recent work by Oppenheim and Wehner [9] has
brought to light a rather general theory-independent
quantitative relationship between uncertainty relations
and nonlocality. The absence of an uncertainty relation
rules out nonlocality. They have also considered a certain
different notion of complementarity1 (our property (c))
and noted that the absence of such complementarity also
rules out nonlocality.
In this paper, we would like to define two other con-
∗ tobias.fritz@icfo.es
1 In Section D of [9]. Note that Oppenheim and Wehner do not
regard the existence of an uncertainty relation as complementar-
ity.
cepts of complementarity. In the particular case of quan-
tum theory, both are equivalent to non-commutativity
of observables. For each of these two notions of com-
plementarity, we then ask whether there are no-signaling
theories which display nonlocality, although they do not
display this kind of complementarity. We answer this
in the positive by finding unphysical toy theories which
have all the required properties.
II. WHAT IS COMPLEMENTARITY?
So what actually is complementarity? In particular,
once we leave the framework of quantummechanics, what
does it mean to say that observables A and B are com-
plementary? Bohr [4] has coined this term and used it to
refer to the practical impossibility of a joint measurement
of A and B:
“[. . . ] it is only the mutual exclusion of
any two experimental procedures, permit-
ting the unambiguous definition of comple-
mentary physical quantities, which provides
room for new physical laws, the coexistence
of which might at first sight appear irrecon-
cilable with the basic principles of science. It
is just this entirely new situation as regards
the description of physical phenomena, that
the notion of complementarity aims at char-
acterizing.”
This reduces the problem of defining complementarity
to the problem of defining joint measurability.
Clearly, the concept of joint measurability should be
taken to mean joint measurability in theory rather than
joint measurability in practice; for if it were to mean the
latter, than this would let the complementarity of A and
B depend on the current state of the art in experiment
and on the skill of the experimenter.
2One can attribute different operational meanings to
the concept of joint measurability of A and B. We will
consider the following four:
(a) Joint distribution: there is an observable C from
the measurement of which one can deduce both the
value of A and the value of B (meaning that the
probability distribution over outcomes of C con-
tains those of A and B as marginals).
(b) Symmetric nondisturbance of measurements: in
the measurement sequence ABA, the two measure-
ments of A always give the same result. Similarly
for the sequence BAB.
(c) Asymmetric nondisturbance of measurements [10,
Sec. 7-4.C]: on any initial state, the measurement
sequence AB gives the same probability distribu-
tion over outcomes of B as a direct measurement
of B.
(d) No uncertainty relation: there is no non-trivial un-
certainty relation between the outcome distribution
of A and that of B. This can be formalized in sev-
eral inequivalent ways, e.g. in terms of entropic un-
certainty relations [8] or in terms of the fine-grained
uncertainty relations of [9].
Lemma 1. In the case of quantum theory with projective
measurements, properties (a), (b) and (c) are equivalent
to commutativity of A and B.
This is straightforward to prove, but we nevertheless
include a proof sketch for the sake of completeness.
Proof. We work in terms of the spectral decompositions
B =
∑
λ∈sp(A) λPλ and B =
∑
λ∈sp(B) λQλ. Each Pλ
can be written as a polynomial in A, and each Qλ as a
polynomial in B. So if A and B commute, then PλQµ =
QµPλ for all λ, µ; the converse is also clear.
To see that property (a) follows from commutativity,
choose an injection j : sp(A) × sp(B) →֒ R and define
C =
∑
λ∈sp(A), µ∈sp(B) j(λ, µ)PλQµ. By injectivity of j,
a measurement of C automatically also measures both
A and B. Conversely, if C corresponds to a joint mea-
surement of A and B as in property (a), then there are
polynomials f and g such that A = f(C) and B = g(C),
and therefore A commutes with B.
Property (b) and property (c) are each equivalent to∑
λ PλQµPλ = Qµ and
∑
µQµPλQµ = Pλ. The first
equation implies that PλQµP
′
λ = 0 for λ 6= λ
′. Therefore,
PλQµ =
∑
λ′
PλQµPλ′ =
∑
λ
PλQµPλ
=
∑
λ′
Pλ′QµPλ = QµPλ
which implies commutativity of A and B. The same cal-
culation also shows the converse implication.
Despite this equivalence in the quantum case, beyond
quantum theory these four notions of complementarity
are conceptually very different. For example, proper-
ties (a) and (d) do not care about any post-measurement
states under measuring either A or B, but only about the
distribution of outcome probabilities; for property (c),
this only applies to measurement A; while for prop-
erty (b), the post-measurement states of both A and B
are relevant. Further discussion on the interrelations be-
tween these properties is beyond the scope of this work.
III. NONLOCALITY REQUIRES
COMPLEMENTARITY?
It seems to be intuitive that complementarity is a nec-
essary requirement for displaying nonlocality. One may
believe that any no-signaling theory which does not dis-
play complementarity admits a local realistic description.
Indeed, this can be made precise for property (c) as fol-
lows [9, D.1]: if property (c) holds for all pairs A, B,
then it follows that the outcome distribution of any ob-
servable A does not depend on whether other A is mea-
sured directly, or other observables are measured before
A. This implies that one can assign a joint probability
distribution to all the observables at once, and hence the
existence of a local realistic model of the resulting cor-
relations. For bounds on certain kinds of nonlocality in
terms of uncertainty relations as in property (d), we also
refer to [9].
One might now conjecture that also the properties (a)
and (b), together with the no-signaling principle, are like-
wise sufficient in order to exlucde nonlocal behavior.
In the following, we will show that this is not nec-
essarily so. In Section IV (resp. V), we will describe a
no-signaling toy theory which has property (a) (resp. (b))
for every pair of measurements A,B, but maximally vi-
olates the Bell inequality of Clauser, Horn, Shimony and
Holt [6] (CHSH inequality). These two toy theories are
more classical than quantum mechanics in the sense of
having less complementarity, but nevertheless display a
higher degree of nonlocality.
There are several things that should be kept in mind
while reading this paper. First and most importantly,
our constructions are toy theories, which means that we
do not ascribe any physical significance to them. In fact,
they can easily be seen to be unphysical. Any toy theory
displaying nonlocality with “less” complementarity than
quantum mechanics is necessarily unphysical—precisely
because of the very feature of displaying less complemen-
tarity than quantum mechanics, which is our current the-
oretical framework for (microscopic) physics. Therefore,
the present investigations should not be regarded as ac-
tual physics in the sense of describing reality, but rather
as theoretical investigations around the foundations of
Bell’s theorem.
Second, the systems which make up our toy theories
are nonlocal systems, in the sense that their states and
3observables are only defined globally in the whole “toy
universe”, and not locally. This is just like in quantum
mechanics, where wave functions are likewise nonlocal en-
tities. For simplicity, our small toy universe only consists
of two independent worldline segments called “Alice” and
“Bob”, which we take to be spacelike separated.
Third, what we regard as a “theory” comprises the def-
inition of both states and measurements. While in some
frameworks, the set of measurements may be determined
by the set of states (and/or vice versa), we do not assume
this to be the case. Our toy theories can be formalized
in the language of generalized probabilistic theories and
then satisfy the Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 7 of [2], but
not its Assumptions 4, 5 and 6. See also footnote 4 and
Section VIII.A in [2].
Fourth, while our toy theories are obviously tailored
to achieve maximal nonlocality in the CHSH scenario, it
makes perfect sense to consider them independently of
any considerations involving Bell inequalities or nonlo-
cality, and in particular independently of any particular
Bell scenario.
Sections IV and V can be read independently.
IV. NONLOCALITY WITH JOINTLY
MEASURABLE OBSERVABLES
We now describe the first toy theory which maximally
violates the CHSH inequality by reproducing the corre-
lations of the Popescu-Rohrlich box (PR-box [11], Ta-
ble I), but nevertheless satisfies property (a) for all rel-
evant pairs of observables. The basic idea is that the
PR-box correlations between Alice’s observables A1, A2
and Bob’s observables B1, B2 do not prevent A1 and A2
from having a joint distribution; and likewise for B1 and
B2. (What it does prevent is the existence of a joint
distribution for all four observables together [7].) More-
over, for each Alice and Bob one can define an observable
which probes this joint distribution.
We will define the state space of the toy theory in terms
of four “basic observables” A1, A2, B1, B2. We assume
these four observables to be ±1-valued. Following the
idea outlined in the previous paragraph, we now define
a (mixed) state of the toy theory to be an assignment of
joint outcome probabilities to each pair of observables,
such that the different ways to calculate the marginal
of each single observable all give the same two-outcome
distribution. More concretely, such a state is given by six
four-outcome probability distributions
PA1,A2(a1, a2), PA1,B1(a1, b1), PA1,B2(a1, b2),
PA2,B1(a2, b1), PA2,B2(a2, b2), PB1,B2(b1, b2),
(1)
satisfying the marginal conditions
∑
y
PX,Y (x, y) =
∑
y
PX,Y ′(x, y)
A1 A2
+1 −1 +1 −1
B1
+1 12 0
1
2 0
−1 0 12 0
1
2
B2
+1 12 0 0
1
2
−1 0 12
1
2 0
TABLE I. Table of joint outcome probabilities for the
Popescu-Rorhlich box.
for all observables X,Y, Y ′ ∈ {A1, A2, B1, B2} and any
outcome x. When X is an observable of Alice and
Y, Y ′ are Bob’s, or vice versa, these are precisely the
no-signaling equations.
Since the set of all these states is convex, it is automati-
cally closed under probabilistic mixtures. In the abstract
framework of [1], this state space is the set of empiri-
cal models over four measurements A1, A2, B1, B2 with
measurement contexts precisely all the pairs of measure-
ments.
This definition should make it clear that we would
like to regard the four basic observables A1, A2, B1, B2
as measurements which can all be performed pairwise
jointly, but not triplewise jointly. Following this idea, the
set of observables of the toy theory is defined to consist
of the basic observables together with the four-outcome
observables representing pairwise joint measurements.
The physical picture behind joint measurability of all
observable pairs is as follows: there is a source of entan-
gled particle pairs which distributes them to Alice’s and
Bob’s labs, respectively. In Alice’s lab, she can choose to
measure either A1 or A2; in Bob’s lab, he can choose
between B1 and B2. Moreover, as an additional op-
tion, there is a third experimenter, who has access to the
source of entangled pairs; let us call him Charlie. Char-
lie can decide to let an entangled pair pass by and reach
the labs of Alice and Bob; or he can decide to apply
a measurement of one of two four-outcome observables
CA and CB. In this latter case, the entangled pair gets
destroyed due to the measurement process. The three
experimenters find out that the observable CA behaves
like a joint distribution of A1 and A2, while CB behaves
like a joint distribution of B1 and B2, in the sense of
property (a).
This toy theory has the following features:
• Among the basic observables A1, A2, B1, B2, all
pairs are jointly measurable in the sense of prop-
erty (a);
• The theory contains states which display PR-box
correlations: defining a state through the joint dis-
tributions of Table I together with any joint distri-
bution of A1 and A2 with uniform marginals, and
likewise between B1 and B2, gives the desired re-
sult.
4We conclude that joint measurability of local observ-
ables together with the no-signaling principle is not suffi-
cient to guarantee the existence of a local hidden variable
description.
V. NONLOCALITY WITH MUTUALLY
NONDISTURBING MEASUREMENTS
We will now define our second toy theory in terms of a
finite number of states and observables. Similar to before,
the observables are all ±1-valued and they are going to be
denoted by A1, A2, B1, B2; we will think of A1 and A2 as
observables located on the subsystem “Alice”, while B1
and B2 are observables on the subsystem “Bob”. The
model will have the following properties:
(a) All measurements are perfectly mutually nondis-
turbing: sequential measurements of the same ob-
servable always give the same value, no matter
which other measurements were conducted in the
meantime.
(On the other hand, for each measurement, there
are some states on which the outcome is random.
Post-measurement states are in general different
from pre-measurement states.)
(b) Signaling is impossible: the outcome probability
distribution of any measurement sequence of Bob
does not depend on the actions of Alice, and vice
versa.
(c) The correlations between Ai and Bj constitute a
Popescu-Rohrlich box [11], thereby maximally vio-
lating the CHSH inequality [6].
Before diving into the details, we describe a different
model2 which is operationally almost equivalent to our
toy theory. Suppose that Alice and Bob share a PR-
box, and in addition each party has a memory of two
bits available. The purpose of Alice’s two bits is to store
any previously measured values of A1 and A2, and like-
wise for Bob’s two bits. Now upon the first measurement
carried out on each subsystem, the PR-box is used, and
the measurement outcome is stored in the correspond-
ing bit, while the other local bit is initialized randomly
and independently. All subsequent measurements only
reproduce the values of the corresponding local bit. This
simple protocol already is a model having property (b)
while displaying PR-box correlations.
The following toy theory is essentially an elaboration
on this idea. It has the additional feature of having a
classical state space. Also, it does not artificially distin-
guish the first measurement from subsequent ones.
2 due to Matthew Pusey.
outcome −1 outcome +1
A1 a
⊖
1 a
∅
2b
−
1 b
−
2 a
⊕
1 a
∅
2b
+
1 b
+
2
A2 a
∅
1a
⊖
2 b
−
1 b
+
2 a
∅
1a
⊕
2 b
+
1 b
−
2
B1 a
−
1 a
−
2 b
⊖
1 b
∅
2 a
+
1 a
+
2 b
⊕
1 b
∅
2
B2 a
−
1 a
+
2 b
∅
1b
⊖
2 a
+
1 a
−
2 b
∅
1b
⊕
2
TABLE II. Table of post-measurement states for the model
described in Section V with pre-measurement state a∅1a
∅
2b
∅
1b
∅
2.
For each observable, each outcome has probability 1/2, and
the post-measurement state is given by the table entry corre-
sponding to that outcome.
A pure state in the toy theory is defined to be a formal
expression of the form aj1a
k
2b
l
1b
m
2 , where each of the upper
indices is an element of the set of hidden values
V = {∅,−,+,⊖,⊕} .
An example of a pure state is a+1 a
∅
2b
⊖
1 b
−
2 . The elements of
V correspond to properties of the associated observable
as follows. When the state is of the form a∅1 . . ., then we
say that the hidden value of the observable A1 is unde-
termined ; on states of the form a−1 . . ., we say that A1
has a potential value of −1, while on those which look
like a+1 . . ., the observable A1 has a potential value of
+1. On states like a⊖1 . . ., we associate to A1 an actual
value of −1, while on a⊕1 . . ., the observable A1 has an
actual value of +1. The same applies to the observables
A2, B1 and B2. We will soon explain the significance of
undetermined values, potential values and actual values.
A mixed state is defined to be a probabilistic ensemble
of pure states. This means that the theory has a classi-
cal state space in the sense that every state is a unique
probabilistic mixture of pure states. We will mostly work
on the level of pure states rather than ensembles; when
not explicitly mentioned otherwise, “state” means “pure
state”.
We now need to define the measurements. Since
now we are interested in measurement sequences, we
also need to consider post-measurement states. There-
fore, a measurement definition consists of assignments of
probabilities for each outcome on each pre-measurement
state, as well as a (probabilistic) assignment of post-
measurement state for each combination of outcome and
pre-measurement state which occurs with non-zero prob-
ability. We take these data to be given as follows:
(a) The outcome probabilities for any observable are
determined by the hidden value of that observable.
If this value is undetermined, both outcomes occur
equally likely with probability 1/2; otherwise, the
potential value or actual value is reproduced with
certainty.
(b) The post-measurement states are defined by spec-
ifying how the hidden values of the observables
change. For all pre-measurement states except
a∅1a
∅
2b
∅
1b
∅
2, we define this to work as follows. The
5hidden value of the observable always turns into
that actual value which corresponds to the mea-
surement outcome. All other hidden values stay
untouched, except when the other observable of the
same party has a potential value; in this case, this
potential value flips its sign with a probability of
1/2.
(c) The post-measurement states of a∅1a
∅
2b
∅
1b
∅
2 are as in
Table II.
For example, on the pre-measurement state a+1 a
∅
2b
⊖
1 b
−
2 ,
a measurement of A1 gives a definite +1 outcome and
yields the post-measurement state a⊕1 a
∅
2b
⊖
1 b
−
2 ; a measure-
ment of A2 gives a random outcome; if this outcome is
+1, then the post-measurement state is randomly cho-
sen between a+1 a
⊖
2 b
⊖
1 b
−
2 and a
−
1 a
⊖
2 b
⊖
1 b
−
2 ; if it is −1, then
between a+1 a
⊕
2 b
⊖
1 b
−
2 and a
−
1 a
⊕
2 b
⊖
1 b
−
2 . Measuring B1 gives
a definite −1 outcome where the two post-measurement
states a+1 a
∅
2b
⊖
1 b
−
2 and a
+
1 a
∅
2b
⊖
1 b
+
2 are equally likely. Fi-
nally, a measurement of B2 has a definite −1 outcome,
with post-measurement state a+1 a
∅
2b
⊖
1 b
⊖
2 .
This ends the definition of the model. We can now
turn to the study of its properties.
One characteristic property of classical systems is that
measurements do not change the state of the system.
This is not always the case in our model; for example,
when the pre-measurement state is x = a∅1a
∅
2b
∅
1b
∅
2, then
the post-measurement is always different from x, no mat-
ter what the measurement and its outcome are. Never-
theless, the model has several nice properties which make
it look classical in some respects. One of these is the fol-
lowing:
Lemma 2. For any pre-measurement state, all measure-
ments in this model are mutually nondisturbing: if
. . . , Ai, . . . , Ai, . . .
is any sequence of measurements containing Ai at least
twice, then these two measurements of Ai have the same
outcome with probability 1. Likewise for Bj.
Proof. By definition of post-measurement states, after
the first measurement of Ai the state has an actual value
on ai, and this value never changes in any subsequent
measurement. Hence all further measurements of Ai will
reproduce this value with certainty.
Proposition 3. The model does not allow signaling in
the following sense: for any initial state, the outcome
distribution of any measurement sequence of Bob does
not depend on how many and which measurements Alice
conducts in the meantime, and conversely.
Proof. On any initial state which is not a∅1a
∅
2b
∅
1b
∅
2, this is
clear since the measurement rules are “local” in the sense
that measuring A1 or A2 can only change the hidden
values of a1 and a2, and likewise for B1 or B2.
On the initial state a∅1a
∅
2b
∅
1b
∅
2, one can reason as fol-
lows. We may assume without loss of generality that
Bob’s measurement sequence contains both B1 and B2
at least once. Then due to lemma 2, it is actually enough
to assume that he measures both of them exactly once.
Then we claim that all four outcome sequences (±1,±1)
occur with an equal probability of 1/4 in all cases. This
is easy to verify if the first measurement is conducted by
Bob, since then again Alice’s actions do not change any
hidden values of Bob’s. If the first measurement is con-
ducted by Alice, then by Table II, Bob’s hidden values are
both potential. They are perfectly correlated if Alice’s
first measurement was A1, and perfectly anticorrelated
if she started with A2. In either case, this correlation
gets erased due to Bob’s first measurement, which may
flip one of the two potential values, so that all four pos-
sible sign combinations are equally likely, independently
of what Alice did.
For this last part of the proof, the distinction between
potential values and actual values is crucial: if we would
regard all potential values as actual values which never
change in any measurement, then signaling would be pos-
sible since Bob could measure whether B1 andB2 are per-
fectly correlated or perfectly anticorrelated, and thereby
he would know whether Alice measured A1 or A2.
Proposition 4. On the initial state a∅1a
∅
2b
∅
1b
∅
2, the cor-
relations between Ai and Bj coincide with those of the
PR-box (Table I).
Proof. This can be directly checked from the rules spec-
ified above together with Table II, which has been con-
structed precisely in such a way that the correlations
of the Popescu-Rohrlich box (Table I) can be repro-
duced.
Reply to potential criticism. There are several defi-
ciences which one may deem this toy theory to have and
which have been pointed out to us in discussion. We
would like to address some of these now.
First, one may remark that the theory is unphysical:
it has almost trivial dynamics and contradicts quantum
mechanics. This is certainly correct, and it ought to be
kept in mind that this is the whole point of this investiga-
tion: how classical can a theory be while still displaying
nonlocality?
Second, one may object that the theory is very un-
natural: the state a∅1a
∅
2b
∅
1b
∅
2 is a state that can never
be prepared within the theory starting from any other
state. While this is correct, one can easily amend the the-
ory by extra bells and whistles which remedy this prob-
lem and similar ones. For example, one can add a new
many-outcome observable X which randomly prepares
any state and whose outcome is the numerical represen-
tation of this prepared state.
Third, one may wonder what would happen when Al-
ice and Bob measure simultaneously? It seems that joint
measurements have not been defined in the theory. But
thanks to Proposition 3, this is irrelevant. If Alice mea-
sures Ai and Bob simultaneously measures Bj , one can
6describes this in the toy theory as either the measure-
ment sequence AiBj or as the measurement sequence
BjAi. While these two time orderings are inequivalent
as transformations on states, Proposition 3 implies that
the observational predictions coincide.
VI. DISCUSSION
The notion of complementary in fundamental physics
refers to the phenomenon that to some pairs of observ-
ables, it is impossible to consistently assign values to both
of them at the same time. It is generally believed that a
no-signaling theory without complementary observables
cannot display nonlocality. Along these lines, a quan-
titative relationship between uncertainty relations and
certain kinds of nonlocality has been worked out in [9].
In the work, we have pointed out that nonlocality does
not necesssarily require complementarity.
In Section II we have discussed several ways to for-
malize the notion of joint measurability as properties (a)
to (d), and noted that a no-signaling theory with prop-
erty (c) or (d) for all pairs of observables always allows
local hidden variables and therefore cannot display non-
locality. In Section IV, we have discussed a simple toy
example of a generalized probabilistic theory which maxi-
mally violates the CHSH inequality by displaying PR-box
correlations, although the corresponding local observ-
ables are jointly measurable in the sense of property (a).
In Section V, we have described a no-signaling toy theory
which also displays PR-box behavior, although its state
space is classical and it satisfies property (b) for all pairs
of observables.
While we expect our results to be valid not only for
maximal violations of the CHSH inequality, but more
generally for any no-signaling violation of any Bell in-
equality, we have not considered these more general cases
so far. For the sake of maximal concreteness, we have
preferred to consider a specific example only.
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